Bucklew v. Precythe: The Power of Assumptions and Lethal Injection by Gomez, Renata
GOMEZ_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)  3/13/2019 1:53 PM 
 
 
BUCKLEW V. PRECYTHE: THE 




Once again, the Supreme Court of the United States has an 
opportunity to determine the extent to which death-row inmates can 
bring as-applied challenges to the states’ method of execution and 
prevent possible botched executions. In Bucklew v. Precythe, the 
Court will confront the assumptions that the execution team is 
equipped to handle any execution and that the procedure will go as 
planned.1 Additionally, the Court will determine whether the standard 
articulated in Glossip v. Gross, which requires inmates asserting facial 
challenges to the states’ method of execution to plead a readily 
available alternative method of execution, further extends to inmates 
asserting as-applied challenges.2 If inmates must plead an alternative 
method less likely to cause severe pain, the Court will clarify whether 
such motions for summary judgment should be decided based on the 
record as a whole or if the inmate must present evidence comparing 
the two alternative methods of execution through the testimony of a 
single witness.3 Based on these findings, the Court will determine 
whether Bucklew met the standard under Glossip v. Gross.4 
This commentary argues that inmates launching an as-applied 
challenge to the state’s method of execution should be given relevant 
discovery regarding the execution teams’ qualifications, that inmates 
should not have to provide a detailed alternative method of 
execution, and that summary judgment decisions should be made 
 
Copyright ©2019 Renata Gomez. 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2020.1. Brief for Petitioner at *i, 
Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17-8151, 2018 WL 3456065 (U.S. July 16, 2018) (No. 17-
8151[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]).  
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Id. (referencing Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015)). 
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after considering the record as a whole. Only then will inmates be 
afforded complete and fair access to the protections of the Eighth 
Amendment in the interest of avoiding more botched executions. In 
addressing the questions presented, the Court must weigh the ease 
with which an inmate can raise a viable challenge to the method of 
execution against the State’s ability to carry out a death sentence. The 
Supreme Court should remand to the lower court for a further 
evidentiary hearing in Bucklew’s case to determine whether 
execution by lethal gas significantly reduces a substantial risk of 
severe pain compared to lethal injection. 
I. FACTS 
A. Bucklew’s Medical Condition 
A Missouri jury convicted and sentenced Russel Bucklew to death 
in 1998 for first degree murder, kidnapping, burglary, forcible rape, 
and armed criminal action.5 Bucklew is challenging the method of 
execution as it applies to him, not his conviction or death sentence.6 
Bucklew suffers from cavernous hemangioma, which causes 
“inoperable, blood-filled tumors to grow in his throat and around his 
face, head, and neck.”7 Bucklew’s tumors are extremely sensitive,8 so 
“merely touching his airway can cause his airway and uvula” to 
bleed.9 Bucklew also has difficulty breathing,10 and the peripheral 
veins in his hands and arms have been damaged by the illness.11 
B. Missouri’s Execution Protocol and History 
Missouri’s method of execution statute authorizes execution by 
either lethal gas or lethal injection.12 Missouri has not conducted an 
 
 5.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *5.  
 6.  See id. (clarifying that “[Bucklew] does not challenge the validity of his conviction or 
death sentence”). 
 7.  Id. (citing Joint Appendix Vol. II at *857, *819–20, *220, *328, * 648–49, Buckew v. 
Precythe (No. 17-8151), 2018 WL 3473995 (U.S. March 15, 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. 
Mar. 15, 2018) [hereinafter J.A. II]). 
 8.  J.A. II, supra note 7, at *857. 
 9.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *5 (citing Joint Appendix Vol. I at *225–26, *228–
29, Bucklew, 2018 WL 3473994 [hereinafter J.A. I]). 
 10.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *6 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *226–27). But see 
Brief of Respondents, at *9, Bucklew, 2018 WL 3969564 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *643) 
(stating that Bucklew has never shown signs of having trouble breathing).  
 11.  J.A. II, supra note 7, at *857. 
 12.  See MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.720 (West 2007).  
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execution by lethal gas since 1965.13 While the state has developed a 
written procedure for execution by lethal injection, it does not have a 
written procedure for execution by lethal gas.14 While one state 
official in Missouri has researched execution via Nitrogen Hypoxia, it 
was determined that there was not enough information available to 
answer open questions about the procedure.15 However, officials in 
Louisiana and Oklahoma concluded that execution by Nitrogen 
Hypoxia would be an easy, cheap, and humane method of execution 
after extensive investigation.16 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Relevant Case Law 
The Supreme Court articulated in Helling v. McKinney that an 
inmate must show that the state’s execution method presents a risk 
that is first, “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless 
suffering,” and second, “gives rise to ‘sufficiently imminent 
dangers.’”17 In Baze v. Rees, the Court interpreted the standard 
presented in Helling to require inmates to show that there is “a 
‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively intolerable risk of 
harm’ that prevents prison officials from pleading that they were 
‘subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.’”18 
Then the Court added a second prong: an inmate must proffer an 
alternative method of execution that is “feasible, readily 
implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of 
severe pain.”19 Once the inmate successfully meets the first two 
prongs, the state can refuse to adopt the alternative method only if it 
 
 13.  J.A. II, supra note 7, at *667.  
 14.  See Mo. Dep’t of Corrs. Preparation and Admin. of Chems. for Lethal Injection (Oct. 
18 2013), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/ExecutionProtocols/MissouriProtocol10.18.2013 
.pdf. 
 15.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at *15.  
 16.  See J.A. II, supra note 7, at *736–49 (explaining the finding by researchers in 
Oklahoma and Louisiana that death by Nitrogen Hypoxia through a mask or an oxygen tent 
would be the most humane method of execution). Researchers also noted that this method 
would not require medical professionals because the individual would pass out after their level 
of oxygen fell too low; they based their conclusions on studies examining air pilots and 
individuals who chose this method as a way to commit suicide. 
 17.  Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50–51 (2008) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 
34–35 (1993)). 
 18.  Id. at 51 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846, and n. 9, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 
128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). 
 19.  Id.  
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has a “legitimate penological justification” for keeping its current 
execution method.20 
Most recently, the Supreme Court applied the elements 
articulated in Baze to a challenge against Oklahoma’s method of 
execution in Glossip v. Gross.21 In Glossip, the inmates alleged that 
the State’s lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment 
because Midazolam, the first drug used under this protocal, does not 
render an inmate unconscious and therefore creates an unacceptable 
risk of severe pain.22 The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit and held 
that the inmates failed to identify a known and available alternative 
method of execution that reduces the risk of pain.23 The petitioners in 
Glossip proffered the use of sodium thiopental, or pentobarbital, as 
part of a single-drug protocol as an alternative to using midazolam. 
The Tenth Circuit did not find a clear error in the lower courts’ 
finding that both drugs were unavailable to the Oklahoma 
Department of Corrections.24 The Court also held that the district 
court did not commit clear error when it found that the petitioners 
did not meet their burden of proof in showing that a massive dose of 
midazolam carries a substantial risk of severe pain.25 To support this 
decision, the Court cited numerous lower courts that have found that 
using midazolam as the first drug in a three-drug protocol is likely to 
render an inmate insensate to pain.26 
B. Procedural Posture 
Bucklew initially filed a complaint with the district court on May 
9, 2014 and moved for a stay on May 14, 2014 to provide adequate 
time to litigate his claims before his scheduled execution on May 21, 
2014.27 The district court dismissed Bucklew’s first five claims for 
failing to plead an alternative method of execution.28 An Eighth 
 
 20.  Id.  
 21. 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2729 (2015) (“To succeed on an Eighth Amendment method-of-
execution claim, a prisoner must establish that the method created a demonstrated risk of 
severe pain and that the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available 
alternatives.”) 
 22.  Id. at 2731.  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 2738.  
 25.  Id. at 2731.  
 26.  See id. at 2739–40. 
 27.  Id. at *17. 
 28.  Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014, at *6–7 (W.D. Mo. 
May 19, 2014), rev’d by 783 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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Circuit panel granted a stay, but the stay was vacated en banc later 
that day.29 The Supreme Court, however, ordered a stay of execution 
while he litigated his appeal.30 The Eighth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding that 
plaintiffs asserting an as-applied challenge must proffer an alternative 
method of execution.31 Bucklew filed his Fourth Amended Complaint 
in which he challenged the constitutionality of Missouri’s execution 
protocol as it applied to him.32 He alleged that Missouri’s lethal 
injection protocol inflicted needless suffering and therefore violated 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.33 The Complaint also, for the first time, proffered lethal 
gas as an alternative method of execution.34 
On remand, Bucklew sought discovery regarding the 
qualifications and training of medical members of the execution 
team.35 Although the district court denied the majority of Bucklew’s 
discovery requests, it granted discovery regarding: the identity of the 
chemical to be used for the lethal injection; the chemical’s expected 
effect; the general composition of the medical team and functions of 
those persons; information about how the State had used cyanide gas; 
and information about the States research into the feasibility of using 
nitrogen.36 The district court then granted the State’s motion for 
summary judgment, concluding that the record did not present a 
genuine dispute concerning whether execution by lethal gas would 
significantly reduce Bucklew’s risk of needless suffering, as compared 
to Missouri’s lethal injection protocol.37 
 
 29.  Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 Fed.Appx. 562 (8th Cir. 2014), vacated en banc, 134 S. Ct. 
2333 (2014). 
 30.  Bucklew v. Lombardi, 572 U.S. 1131 (2014).  
 31.  Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1127–28 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (rejecting 
Bucklew’s argument that he was not required to propose an alternative method of execution 
because he was not raising a facial challenge to Missouri’s execution protocol). 
 32.  See generally Fourth Amended Complaint, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No.14-08000, 2015 
WL 13717950 (W.D.Mo.) (challenging the constitutionality of Missouri’s execution protocol as 
it applied to Bucklew). 
 33.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *16 (quoting J.A. I, supra note 9, at *85-86 ¶¶ 148, 
151). See generally Fourth Amended Complaint, Bucklew, 2015 WL 13717950. 
 34.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *16 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *85 ¶ 150). See 
generally Fourth Amended Complaint, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No.14-08000, 2015 WL 13717950 
(W.D.Mo.). 
 35.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *18. 
 36.  See Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at *18 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *116–26). 
 37.  J.A. II, supra note 7, at *828–32. 
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III. HOLDING 
A divided Eighth Circuit panel38 affirmed the district court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the State and vacated 
the stay,39 concluding that Bucklew provided no evidence showing 
that lethal gas would substantially reduce his risk of severe pain.40 The 
Court of Appeals reasoned that he did not meet the Glossip standard 
because the evidence showing a difference between the two methods 
had not come from a single witness.41 The panel majority also upheld 
the district court’s decision to deny Bucklew’s request for discovery 
into the qualifications of the execution team,42 and denied Bucklew’s 
petition for a panel rehearing or a rehearing en banc, as well as his 
motion for an emergency stay.43 On April 30, 2018, the Supreme Court 
stayed Bucklew’s execution and granted his petition for writ of 
certiorari.44 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Petitioner first argues that Glossip and Baze do not require courts 
to assume neiither that state personnel are competent to deal with a 
medical condition nor that the execution will go as planned. These 
assumptions effectively void the purpose of as-applied challenges 
because the inmates bringing such challenges will necessarily assert 
that the procedure will not go as intended.45 Consequently, the 
discovery requested by Bucklew regarding the qualifications of the 
execution team was relevant because the Director of Missouri’s 
Department of Corrections testified that she would rely upon the 
 
 38.  Bucklew v. Precythe, 883 F.3d 1087, 1100 (8th Cir. 2018) (Colloton, J., dissenting) (“If 
the factfinder accepted [expert testimony from both parties] as to the effect of nitrogen gas, then 
Bucklew’s proposed alternative method would significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe 
pain.”). Justice Colloton also observed that the general rule allows the trier of fact to accept all 
or just a part of any witnesses’ testimony, and that on summary judgment one party can rely on 
a portion of the opposing party’s expert’s testimony to create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Id. 
 39.  Bucklew, 883 F.3d at 1090. 
 40.  Id. at 1094. 
 41.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *24 (stating that the 8th Circuit “imposed a 
novel rule that a claimant cannot prevail unless all elements of his claim are established through 
the testimony of a single expert witness”). 
 42.  883 F.3d at 1096–97. 
 43.  J.A. II, supra note 7, at *884–87.  
 44.  Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 17–8151, 138 S.Ct. 1706 (2018) (mem.). 
 45.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *25–30. 
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execution team to make judgments as to how to handle Bucklew’s 
unique medical condition.46 Additionally, the amount of information 
that the execution team has regarding his condition directly impacts 
the risk of severe suffering.47 Without his medical history, the team 
will be unable to tailor the execution protocol, such as by refraining 
from placing the gurney in a flat position, to Bucklew’s unique 
needs.48 
Petitioner further asserts that discovery was relevant because 
Missouri’s protocol allows the medical team to attempt to access the 
femoral vein “provided they have appropriate training, education and 
experience for that procedure.”49 Missouri’s protocol itself makes the 
qualifications of the medical team relevant to assessing the risk of 
pain.50 The State’s appellate strategy also illustrates the relevance of 
the requested discovery in Bucklew’s case because the State provided 
an incomplete affidavit, which indicated that Bucklew would not need 
to lie supine during the procedure.51 Furthermore, Bucklew did not 
have a chance to learn what role the State’s witness plays in the 
execution or whether she has the authority to direct the medical 
members of the execution team.52 Thus, petitioner asserts that the 
lower court erred in applying these assumptions to Bucklew’s claim 
and in finding that the requested discovery was irrelevant.53 
Next, Petitioner argues that the assumptions surrounding the 
execution and the medical team’s qualifications are erroneous 
because they conceal “a kind of cruelty that has been a focus of this 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for decades” and indicate a 
 
 46.  See id. at *32 (“Anne Precythe [the Director] has testified that she knows nothing 
about Bucklew’s medical condition and would defer to the [unnamed nurse] and the [unnamed 
anaesthologist] regarding how to handle any issues that might arise during the execution, such 
as how to position Bucklew or obtain venous access.”). 
 47.  See id. (“The less the team knows, the greater Bucklew’s risk of needless suffering.”). 
 48.  See id. at 33–34 (“The summary judgment record reflects that inmates in prior 
executions have been required to lie supine, and no one testified that Bucklew would be treated 
any differently.”). 
 49.  J.A. I, supra note 9, at *214.  
 50.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *33.  
 51.  Id. at *33–34 (explaining that the affidavit provided by the State’s witness does not 
discuss whether Bucklew will have to lie supine if a cutdown procedure is necessary and that it is 
inconsistent with the testimony of the witness’s superior, who said that she would leave 
decisions regarding positioning to the medical team).  
 52.  Id.  
 53.  See id. at *30 (“In the absence of that erroneous assumption, no sound principle . . . 
supports depriving an inmate of the opportunity to ensure that the medical members of the 
execution team are informed about the details of his complicating medical condition, and are 
equipped to manage it so that the inmate does not needlessly suffer.”). 
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“deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s medical condition.54 The state 
officials, asserts petitioner, would violate the Eighth Amendment by 
showing a deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical condition 
because their lack of accomodation constitutes an “unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain.”55 Petitioner contends that the State’s 
decision to proceed with the ordinary execution protocol would show 
a deliberate indifference if state officials are aware that an inmate 
suffers from a rare medical condition that makes him uniquely likely 
to suffer during the procedure.56 Additionally, if the execution goes 
badly, it would not be an “innocent” mistake,57 but instead would 
deny “the essential human dignity” of the officials who carry out the 
execution “by making them an unwitting party to foreseeable 
cruelty.”58 Lastly, the assumptions proffered by the Eighth Circuit “in 
effect absolve[] respondents of their decision to take an unjustified 
risk,” and “leaves state officials free to ignore that risk so long as the 
execution would be humane if all goes as intended.”59 
Bucklew further asserts that the Court should not require inmates 
who raise an as-applied challenge to design an alternative method of 
execution because they do not present the same risk to the death 
penalty as facial challenges.60 In as-applied challenges, the inmates are 
not challenging the death penalty itself as unconstitutional, nor do 
they seek a judgment that would require the state to alter its 
execution protocol as to any other inmate.61 Instead, they are only 
asking that the execution protocol be invalidated in their specific 
cases.62 Importantly, the concern that it would be difficult for a court 
to discern whether the method is cruel and unusual without a pleaded 
alternative is not relevant in as-applied challenges that are based on 
an inmate’s unique medical condition63 because the state’s refusal to 
accommodate the inmate after he makes a substantial showing of risk 
would itself be a basis to consider the method cruel and unusual.64 
 
 54.  Id. at *28.  
 55.  Id. at *28 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).  
 56.  Id. at *28–29.  
 57.  Id. at *29 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (plurality opinion)). 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at *29–30.  
 60.  Id. at *35–36 (stating that Bucklew’s as-applied challenge presents none of the 
concerns that prompt the requirement to provide an alternative in other cases, such as depriving 
the government of the only available means of carrying out capital punishment). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at *42–43. 
 64.  Id. at 43.  
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Even if the Court determines that inmates must assert an 
alternative method of execution, Bucklew argues that the Eighth 
Circuit’s interpretation of Glossip requiring that the inmate produce 
evidence supporting a method of execution claim through the 
testimony of a single witness conflicts with summary judgment rules.65 
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit erred because it did not consider “what 
a reasonable factfinder could have concluded had it heard the whole 
of what both experts had to say,” and did not consider the substantial 
risks that the lethal injection protocol poses to Bucklew before the 
lethal drug is administered when calculating the risks.66 If the court 
had considered the medical expert testimony offered by both parties, 
thus considering the record as a whole, the court would have found 
that execution by lethal gas would significantly reduce the substantial 
risk of severe pain.67 Furthermore, the opinion in Glossip did not 
establish this single witness standard for method of execution claims,68 
and this burden would cripple as-applied challenges to methods of 
execution because many experts who can offer that type of opinion 
are ethically barred from asserting a better way to implement the 
death penalty.69 
Moreover, Bucklew contends that he met this burden under 
Glossip because Respondents did not allege that lethal gas was 
unavailable.70 Additionally, Bucklew supported the proposition that 
execution by lethal gas would significantly reduce his risk of pain 
because it would shorten the period of time during which he would be 
conscious while choking on his own blood.71 Petitioner asserts that he 
 
 65.  Id. at 45 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)) (noting that 
evidence at summary judgment should be evaluated in light of the record as a whole). 
 66.  Id. at 46. 
 67.  See J.A. II, supra note 7, at *877 (Colloton, S., dissenting) (“If the factfinder accepted 
Dr. Zivot’s testimony as to the effect of pentobarbital, and Dr. Antognini’s uncontroverted 
testimony as to effect of nitrogen gas, then Bucklew’s proposed alternative method would 
significantly reduce the substantial risk of severe pain that the district court identified in its 
analysis of the first element.”). 
 68.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1 at *47. 
 69.  See id. at 48 (explaining that witnesses with the requisite medical training “are likely to 
be unable, consistent with professional ethical standards, to propose an alternative method of 
execution that will substantially reduce the risk of suffering”). See also The Hippocratic Oath, 
wherein new medical professionals recite, “I will . . . benefit my patients according to my 
greatest ability and judgement, and I will do no harm or injustice to them,” and vow, “I will not 
give a lethal drug to anyone if I am asked, nor will I advise such a plan.”, 
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/ greek_oath.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
 70.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *51.  
 71.  Id. 
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“faces identifiable severe risks from the procedure both before and 
after the medical team gains venous access and the non-medical team 
begins to administer the lethal drug.”72 Particularly, Bucklew’s tumors 
are likely to rupture due to the repeated attempts by the medical 
team to start an IV.73 
Even if the execution team is successful in starting an IV line, 
Bucklew argues that he is at an increased risk of his vein blowing,74 
and he would be in extreme pain if a vein blows because 
pentobarbital would leak and destroy the surrounding tissue.75 
Furthermore, the petitioner warns that he will lose the ability to 
manage his airway after the lethal drug begins to flow76 and will begin 
to suffocate on his own blood.77 If the execution team does not gain 
access to a peripheral vein, they will likely try to start an IV in the 
femoral vein.78 This procedure, petitioner asserts, will cause him to 
convulse and that the execution team may pierce the femoral artery.79 
Finally, Petitioner argues that inmates should not be required to 
completely design the alternative method of execution because the 
State is in a better position than inmates to develop the detailed 
protocols.80 Inmates have limited access to resources in prisons, 
probably have no experience in writing procedures, and will have 
difficulty receiving guidance from a medical professional due to 
ethical constraints.81 Furthermore, the requirement that an inmate 
designs a detailed step-by-step protocol for his execution does not 
advance the purpose of the known-and-available-alternatives 
requirement.82 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
The State argues that “courts ‘must and do assume that the state 
officials carr[y] out their duties under the death warrant in a careful 
 
 72.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *10 (emphasis omitted). 
 73.  Id. at *11 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *183, *186–87, *232, *234–35, *351).  
 74.  Id. (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *340–41, *189–90). 
 75.  Id. (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *332–33). 
 76.  Id. (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *233). 
 77.  Id. (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *234–35). 
 78.  Id. (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *611–12) (noting that the execution team has used 
the cutdown procedure in the past when attempts at peripheral access failed). 
 79.  Id. at *12 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *343– 45, 232–35). 
 80.  Id. at *52–53. 
 81.  Id. at *53. 
 82.  Id.  
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and humane manner.”83 Respondents claim, moreover, that Bucklew’s 
evidence supports only the prediction of isolated mishaps that would 
not violate the Eighth Amendment because he would be unable to 
feel pain twenty to thirty seconds after the pentobarbital was injected 
into his system,84 and his prediction that the medical team may have 
difficulty inserting an IV line does not establish a sufficiently 
substantial risk of harm when the State has put in place important 
safeguards as a matter of law.85 Here, Missouri has incorporated 
safeguards,86 such as mandating the presence of an anesthesiologist 
and a nurse during executions.87 Although there is disagreement as to 
the amount of information the medical team will have ahead of 
Bucklew’s execution, Respondents claim that the medical records 
they receive will contain more than a one-page summary of his 
medical condition.88 
Respondents further argue that the delay from granting Bucklew’s 
discovery request would have been disproportional to the needs of 
the case because his claim is refuted by existing evidence.89 
Petitioner’s claim that the medical team will repeatedly fail to start an 
IV line is unfounded because it ignores the possibility of accessing a 
peripheral vein in Bucklew’s foot, a procedure he has not claimed 
would be abmormally difficult.90 Nor, for that matter, does the record 
support the contention that the medical team would have difficulty 
establishing a central line, or that he would have to go through a 
cutdown procedure,91 which involves “slicing into the leg to visualize 
the vein.”92 Any error that the Court made in the decision to deny 
discovery, moreover, was harmless because Bucklew failed to provide 
 
 83.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at *39 (quoting State of La. ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1974)) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original).  
 84.  Id. at *38 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48, 50 (2008)). 
 85.  Id. at *39–40 (quoting 553 U.S. at 55). 
 86.  Id. at *40 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *213–14). 
 87.  J.A. I, supra note 9, at *336, *380 (asserting that both medical professionals involved 
are trained to gain IV access through peripheral veins and that all board-certified 
anesthesiologists are trained to access central veins if necessary during Bucklew’s execution). 
 88.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 10, at *40 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *627). But 
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *7–8 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *523–24) (stating 
that the medical team responsible for the execution will not examine or meet with Bucklew 
before the execution and will only be given a single-page summary, not Bucklew’s complete 
medical record). 
 89.  Id. at *53 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).  
 90.  Id. at *53 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *821). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at *8 (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *616–18). 
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an alternative method of execution,93 the district court dismissed the 
only count that hinged on the execution team’s training,94 and he 
never claimed that his suffering would be caused by difficulty in 
accessing his veins in his Fourth Amended Complaint.95 
Respondents argue that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that 
he is “sure or very likely” to suffer severe pain during the lethal 
injection procedure because he will be unconscious within thirty 
seconds after the medical team administers pentobarbital.96 Therefore, 
even if Bucklew experiences a blocked airway during the procedure, 
the execution protocol would not amount to a “serious harm” in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment since he would be unconscious.97 
Furthermore, Bucklew’s expert did not estimate how long it would 
take for Bucklew to become unconscious, which would occur before 
brain death,98 rendering the testimony that brain death would occur 
between 52 and 240 seconds after starting lethal injection irrelevant.99 
Respondents next contend that Bucklew failed to identify an 
alternative method sufficient to satisfy the second element of Glossip 
because proffering Nitrogen Hypoxia without more information 
regarding the procedure (such as the method, rate, quantity, quality, 
concentration, delivery and timing of its administration) does not 
identify any known and readily feasible method of execution.100 
Additionally, Bucklew’s proposed alternative method is both untested 
and vague because no state has ever carried out an execution via 
Nitrogen Hypoxia.101 Respondents presented expert testimony that 
any opinion about how quickly nitrogen would work in an execution 
would not be well founded and that there is no way to determine 
whether execution by nitrogen would be cruel.102 Consequently, 
Bucklew did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate the 
severity and duration of pain he may suffer from an execution by 
nitrogen.103 Without this evidence, it is not possible to compare his 
 
 93.  Id. at *54.  
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at *51 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *42–94). 
 96.  Id. at *33. 
 97.  Id. at *38 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48, 50 (2008)). 
 98.  Id. at *34. 
 99.  Id. at *34 (citing J.A. I, supra note 9, at *196). 
 100.  Id. at *26. 
 101.  Id. at *28 (citing McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d 488, 493 (8th Cir 2017)). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at *28–29. 
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pleaded alternative with the State’s lethal injection protocol.104 
Bucklew’s claim that lethal gas is less likely to cause severe pain than 
lethal injection is therefore unsubstantiated.105 
Further, Respondents argue that Bucklew did not prove that the 
State refused to comply with his proposed alternative method of 
execution without a legitimate penological justification.106 Here, the 
State has a penological justification in adhering to lethal injection as 
the method of execution because he did not successfully offer an 
alternative method that is feasible and readily implemented in 
Missouri for reasons discussed earlier.107 Even if Nitrogen Hypoxia 
can be considered an alternative method under Glossip, the State is 
still justified in adhering to lethal injection because lethal gas has not 
been thoroughly tested.108 Similarly, Missouri “has an interest in 
preserving the dignity of the procedure” and therefore it may 
legitimately refuse to implement an alternative execution method that 
causes symptoms that could be perceived by witnesses as signs that 
the inmate is conscious and in severe pain.109 Additionally, the public 
may be outraged at the State’s use of a gas chamber for capital 
punishment because many people were killed by gas in concentration 
camps during World War II.110 
Next, Respondents argue that the Glossip court explicitly held 
that inmates must offer a feasible, readily available alternative 
method in all Eighth Amendment method of execution claims, 
including as-applied challenges.111 The same principle applies to both 
types of challenges: if “capital punishment is constitutional, there 
must be a constitutional means of carrying it out.”112 Thus, if an 
inmate were to prevail on an as-applied challenge without indicating 
an alternative means of execution, then he would effectively be 
exempt from capital punishment and the State would be estopped 
from carrying through his sentence.113 
 
 104.  Id.. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See id. at *41 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008)). 
 107.  Id. at *42 (citing McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d at 493). 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. (citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 57). 
 110.  Id. at *43. 
 111.  Id. at *43 (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 112.  Id. at *44; see also 135 S. Ct. at 2728. 
 113.  Id. at *44. 
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The State asserts that the alternative method element in Glossip 
should not be waived from as-applied challenges because the element 
is essential to showing that state officials were “subjectively 
blameless.”114 The necessary mens rea, that State officials were 
inflicting pain for the sole purpose of inflicting pain, cannot be 
inferred if they use the only feasible method available to them.115 
Therefore, state officials cannot show that they are blameless and 
acted with a deliberate indifference to the inmates’ suffering unless 
there is a requirement to assert an alternative method.116 In other 
words, state officials are more easily able to show that they did not 
have the culpable state of mind by explaining the reasoning behind 
their refusal to use the pleaded alternative.117 Here, Bucklew failed to 
provide an alternative method of execution and, therefore, the prison 
officials in Missouri chose the only method available to them.118 Since 
it is the only available method, the petitioner cannot prove that the 
state officials showed a deliberate indifference.119 
As a matter of policy, Respondents urge that eliminating the 
alternative-method requirement would encourage meritless claims by 
inmates in an attempt to delay their execution.120 Respondents worry 
that because death sentences have been delayed by an average of 
eighteen years,121 inmates will allege that they have developed some 
medical condition before the State can carry out the execution,122 
resulting in “an explosion” of as-applied challenges.123 
Finally, Respondents argue that Bucklew’s as-applied claim is 
barred by Missouri’s statute of limitations.124 The State explains that 
Bucklew filed an application in 2008, seeking funds partly because he 
would likely suffer serious harm amounting to cruel and unusual 
punishment during his execution by lethal injection.125 Because this is 
the same theory he asserted in his Fourth Amended Complaint, he 
 
 114.  Id. at *45–46. 
 115.  Id. at *47. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  See id. 
 119.  See id.  
 120.  See id. at *47. 
 121.  Id. at *47–48 (citing Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–2765 (2015) (Breyer, J. 
dissenting)). 
 122.  Id. at *48 (emphasis in original). 
 123.  Id. at *49. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *657). 
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must have asserted it in 2013; and by waiting six years, he allowed the 
five-year statute of limitations to run.126 Additionally, Bucklew had 
access to the information sufficient to assert this claim before 2014 
because his subsequent medical expert came to the same findings as 
his first expert.127 
Bucklew is further barred by the principal of res judicata because 
he could have included his as-applied challenge with the facial 
challenge he asserted in prior litigation.128 Therefore, when that suit 
became final, he was barred from asserting his as-applied claim.129 
Even if Bucklew was not permitted to amend his complaint by the 
court, he should have requested permission from the court to split his 
claims into separate suits, or sought leave to amend the claim.130 He 
could have then appealed from an adverse judgment if the court 
denied leave.131 Moreover, the district court did not issue the order 
barring Bucklew from amending his complaint until a month after he 
asserted that he first learned the basis for this current as-applied 
claim.132 Thus, Bucklew assumed the risk that the prior suit would 
reach a final judgment first and bar his claims in this suit.133 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court should clarify whether an inmate raising an 
as-applied challenge to the method of execution is required to plead 
an alternative method of execution under Baze and Glossip. If the 
Court determines that inmates bringing as-applied challenges must 
provide a readily feasible alternative method, the inmates should have 
a genuine opportunity to satisfy these elements without obstacles like 
historically invalidated assumptions, unpredictable state influence, 
and novel evidentiary burdens. Upholding these obstacles discourages 
inmates from bringing as-applied challenges to the state’s method of 
execution because the risk is high that inmates would not be able to 
satisfy the Glossip standard. Finally, the Court has the opportunity to 
 
 126.  See id. at *55 (referencing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4)). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir. 2015) (seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the lethal-injection protocol facially violates the Constitution of the United 
States, the Missouri Constitution, several provisions of state law, and Missouri common law). 
 129.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 10, at *56. 
 130.  Id. at *57 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 1982)). 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. (citing J.A. II, supra note 7, at *852). 
 133.  Id.  
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create a categorical exemption for inmates who show a significant risk 
of suffering due to a medical condition. The Supreme Court should 
reverse the Eighth Circuit’s holding and remand for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
The assumptions that the medical personnel on an execution team 
have adequate training, and that the execution will go as intended, are 
rebuttable according to the text in Glossip and run counter to the 
nature of as-applied claims. The Respondents argue in their Brief that 
the courts “must and do assume that the state officials carry out their 
duties under the death warrant in a careful and humane manner.”134 
However, the Glossip court opines in full: “As nothing has been 
brought to our attention to suggest the contrary, we must and do 
assume that the state officials carried out their duties under the death 
warrant in a careful and humane manner.”135 Therefore, even if there 
is a presumption, Glossip allows inmates to effectively rebut it 
presenting medical evidence demonstrating that they suffers from a 
rare medical illness and that the state has not amended their protocol 
to specifically mitigate the risks in their cases. Additionally, the state 
should not triviliaze as an “accident” the occurrence of severe 
suffering that medical experts in these cases predicted because the 
two are entirely inconsistent. To predict an outcome is defined as “to 
declare or tell in advance”136 and an accident is defined as “any event 
that happens unexpectedly.”137 The inmates, and their experts, are 
predicting in advance that botched executions will occur if the state 
does not take precautions. The harm is, therefore, neither 
“unexpected,” nor an “accident,” and may amount to deliberate 
indifference by the state officials in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
Furthermore, the inquiry into the qualification of execution team 
members should not end with the member’s job title because past 
experience shows that the title does not necessarily correspond with 
competency.138 For example, a member of Tennessee’s current 
 
 134.  Id. at *39 (quoting State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1974)) 
(plurality opinion).  
 135.  329 U.S. at 462. 
 136.  Random House Webster’s Dictionary 1523 (2d unabr. ed. 2001). 
 137.  Id. at 12.  
 138.  See generally Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions (last visited Oct. 
22, 2018). See, e.g., Cedwards, 7 of the World’s Most Horrific Botched Executions, LIFE! DEATH! 
PRIZES! (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.lifedeathprizes.com/real-life-crime/the-worlds-worst-
botched-executions-59193 (reporting that human error was the cause of using a synthetic sponge 
GOMEZ_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2019  1:53 PM 
2019] THE POWER OF ASSUMPTIONS AND LETHAL INJECTION 91 
execution team had a history of drug and alcohol addiction, as well 
as psychological disorders.139 The same medical team was not trained 
in setting up IV lines, administering drugs through the IV lines, or 
monitoring the IV lines while the injections are administered.140 
Importantly, they were not able to identify several problems that 
could occur with IV lines during their use, including “slippage of the 
catheter, stopcocks used to set the directional flow of the IV turned in 
the wrong direction, and injection of the wrong drug.”141 Despite 
evidence to the contrary, the Sixth Circuit in Harbison v. Little hid 
behind stare decisis, citing Baze.142 The court vacated and remanded 
the judgment back to the lower court, determining that the Tennessee 
execution team was adequately trained.143 
In another chilling example, Alan Doerhoff, a doctor on Missouri’s 
execution team, was diagnosed with dyslexia,144 and admitted that he 
both had difficulty reading drug names and improvised drug doses.145 
Even though the state of Missouri fired him for his incompetence, he 
still supervises executions for the federal government.146 These 
instances illustrate the danger and invalidity of these assumptions. 
Discovery should be granted to hold the government employess 
tasked with administering the death penalty to a higher standard. 
Granting discovery may also decrease the frequency of botched 
executions. 
Moreover, the Respondent’s reasoning that, because one member 
of the medical team is an anesthesiologist, Bucklew’s prediction 
would only amount to an “isolated mishap” does not hold merit. 
Recently, the attempted execution of Doyle Lee Hamm in Alabama 
demonstrates the fault in this reasoning.147 After Hamm was 
 
which caused an inmate’s head to catch on fire during execution by electric chair). 
 139.  Harbison v. Little, 571 F.3d 531, 537 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Harbison v. Little, 511 F. 
Supp. 2d 872, 887–88 (M.D. Tenn. 2008)). 
 140.  Id. (citing Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 887). 
 141.  Id. (citing 511 F. Supp. 2d at 888–890) (emphasis added).  
 142.  Id. at 539 (citing 511 F. Supp. 2d at 888–890). 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Mike Pearl, What It’s Like to Be a Death Row Executioner in America, VICE (May 27, 
2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bnpxp5/how-do-you-get-a-job-as-an-
executioner-in-america-526.  
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Id.  
 147.  See Liliana Segura, Another Failed Execution: The Torture of Doyle Lee Hamm, THE 
INTERCEPT (Mar. 3, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/03/03/doyle-hamm-alabama-
execution-lethal-injection; see also Tracy Connor, Doyle Lee Hamm wished for death during 
botched execution, report says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
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diagnosed with large-cell lymphoma, Hamm’s attorney had warned 
the courts for seven months that the medical team would have 
difficulty finding a vein.148 The warnings were ignored. The execution 
team inserted needles multiple times in Hamm’s legs and ankles, and 
eventually tried to gain access through a central line in his right groin, 
despite the State’s own doctor’s warning that there were abnormal 
lymph nodes in that area.149 Witnesses recollected that Hamm, 
because it was so painful, prayed that the medical team would finally 
succeed in taking his life.150 Hamm collapsed once the execution was 
called off and was removed from the gurney.151 It was later discovered 
that the medical team “almost certainly punctured Doyle’s bladder, 
because he was urinating blood for the next day.”152 Thus, medical 
evidence supporting the prediction that the medical team will have 
difficulty inserting an IV should be sufficient to warrant more 
discovery after numerous botched executions.153 To do otherwise 
simply because there is an anaesthologist on the execution team 
would be to turn a blind eye to the suffering that has already 
tarnished the supposedly humane nature of lethal injection.154 
The Respondent’s concern that not requiring inmates to plead an 
alternative method of execution would result in an “explosion” of 
claims is equally unpersuasive because inmates must still satisfy the 
pleading standard established by the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a)(2)155 and the Court’s interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) in Bell 




 148.  See id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  See Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions (last visited Oct. 
22, 2018) (listing examples and causes of botched executions that have occurred in the United 
States from 1982 to 2018).  
 154.  It is worth noting that a bill was introduced earlier this year in Missouri that would 
abolish the death penalty. H.B. 2218, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018). 
 155.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (stating that a successful pleading must contain a “short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).  
 156.  See 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff must assert enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face to pass the pleading stage). See also Brief for Amici 
Curiae Megan McCracken and Jennifer Moreno in Support of Petitioner, Bucklew v. Precythe, 
2018 WL 3584094 (No. 17-8151) (July 23, 2018) (arguing that because as-applied challenges are 
based on specific medical conditions that interact with aspects of the lethal injection process, 
they are necessarily brought only infrequently, and when an inmate brings such a claim, it will 
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created specifically by the Court in Bell to keep out frivolous suits 
from advancing and spending resources in discovery. Additionally, the 
Court went through great lengths to clarify that it was not a 
probability standard.157 Inmates would still need to proffer extensive 
medical evidence to “nudge[] their claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible” to survive a motion to dismiss, but would 
not need to plead that their suffering is “probable.”158 The Court 
should not address this concern by treating inmates differently than 
other plaintiffs. If the State and Court are concerned with a flood of 
as-applied challenges, then the solution must be found elsewhere, such 
as through better medical care in prisons to decrease the frequency of 
inmates suffering from medical illnesses at the time of execution. 
If an inmate who asserts an as-applied challenge to the method of 
execution must offer a readily feasible alternative procedure that in 
fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain, and further 
demeonstrate that the state lacked a penological justification for 
rejecting the alternative, then the different execution methods that are 
available to an inmate should not be limited by the state’s statute. 
First, as argued in the Brief of Scholars and of Academics of 
Constitutional Law, the current test to determinine whether the 
inmate-offered alternative is readily available to the state is 
inconsistent159 and gives the states a veto power over an inmate’s 
Eighth Amendment rights.160 Inmates are restricted in some states 
because an alternative method is only available if it is authorized by 
statute “and/or [the state] has kept its equipment in good operational 
order.”161 In other jurisdictions, the state “must have access to the 
alternative and be able to carry out the alternative method relatively 
easily and reasonably quickly.”162 Thus, the states that follow the 
former standard predetermine the very ability of an inmate to name 
another alternative and the states could pass a statute denying any 
alternative method from being considered altogether. This leaves the 
inmates unable to challenge a state’s method of execution as being 
 
present concrete factual issues that are well within the court’s adjudicative competence and the 
state’s own knowledge). 
 157.  See id. at 545.  
 158.  See id. at 570.  
 159.  Brief of Scholars and of Academics of Constitutional Law as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at *11, Bucklew v. Precythe, 2018 WL 3584093, (U.S July 23), petition for 
cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 15, 2018) (No. 17-8151) [hereinafter Brief of Scholars].  
 160.  Id. at *16. 
 161.  See id. at *16. 
 162.  Id. at *12 (quoting McGehee, 854 F.3d at 493, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1275 (2017)). 
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cruel and unusual.163 Under the latter standard, the same state that 
reasoned that a “lack of an extensive history of use” was a basis to 
reject an alternative methods of execution also found that execution 
by firing squad was not a readily implemented alternative method164 
even though it is one of the nation;s oldest and most easily performed 
methods of execution.165 Thus, the uncertainty around what courts 
would allow as an acceptible alternative method under Glossip 
discourages inmates from asserting as-applied claims. 
The states should share data concerning their methods of 
execution, costs associated with different methods of execution, and 
studies on public opinion. With this shared information, an inmate 
would be able to offer an alternative practice in other states as long as 
it is not cost-prohibitive and there is no proof of public outcry. For 
example, an inmate should be able to offer execution by firing squad 
as an alternative because other states use this method,166 and because 
research indicates that it is an easy and inexpensive method.167 This 
would provide inmates with more options when asserting a readily 
feasible alternative method, increase the odds that they would be able 
to successfully offer an alternative method, and decrease the risk that 
they would suffer extreme pain. 
Alternatively, the Court should categorically exempt from 
execution those inmates who show that a medical condition puts them 
at risk for severe suffering if the state’s protocol is followed without 
accommodation and if there is no alternative method available to the 
State. This type of categorical exemption would not radically deviate 
from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence because the Court has made 
similar determinations in the past based on age,168 and mental 
illness.169 This exemption would reestablish the protection for inmates 
at risk of severe suffering amd preserve the states’ power to inflict the 
death penalty when constitutional violations are not implicated. 
 
 163.  See id. at *18. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. (quoting McGehee, 854 F.3d at 493, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1275 (2017)). 
 166.  See id. at *23 (stating that Utah, Oklahoma and Mississippi currently authorize firing 
squad as a method of execution) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-5.5; Oklahoma H.B. 1879 at § 
1014(D); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-51). 
 167.  See id.  
 168.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (invalidating the death penalty for inmates 
who were under eighteen years old at the time the crime was committed). 
 169.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the death penalty is not 
constitutional when an inmate is intellectually disabled). 
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CONCLUSION 
After seventy-five documented botched executions by lethal 
injection,170 the warnings of the inmates and their medical experts can 
no longer be ignored. The Supreme Court should take care to protect 
the dignity of the Eighth Amendment and protect inmates from 
undue burdens in avoiding inhumane executions. In considering a 
multitude of options from shifting evidentiary burdens to creating an 
exemption, a state’s ability to implement a death sentence should not 
come at the cost of an inmate’s right to access the justice system. 
 
 
 170.  See, e.g., Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions (last visited Oct. 
22, 2018). 
